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The Common Basis of 
Narrative and Music
Somatic, Social, and Affective Foundations
Richard Walsh
It always struck me as a rather counterintuitive de-
velopment that narratology should have been taken 
up by music scholars to the extent that it was from 
the mid-1980s onward.1 Yes, there are hybrid forms in 
which narrative is involved (opera, program music, 
ballet, folk ballad, etc.), but while there may be some 
value in examining such forms from a narratological 
perspective, even here the narrative dimension seems 
inessential; it is not intrinsic to the musical qualities 
of the work. How could it be? Stories are representa-
tional, necessarily—no narration without representa-
tion—whereas music, fundamentally, is not. The en-
counter between music and narratology seemed to be 
a clear case of the overgeneralization of the concept of 
narrative. So I found myself largely in sympathy with 
the reaction against narrative analysis in musicological 
circles, which manifested itself in a series of articles, 
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by several scholars, pointing out that the concepts of narrative theory 
were in several respects redundant or inadequate for the purposes of 
musicology.2 To the extent that a consensus view emerged out of this in-
terdisciplinary encounter, it appeared to be that narratology could not 
deliver on the promise it had briefl y held for some scholars as the theo-
retical foundation of a new, reinvigorated musicology. Rather, its prop-
er and somewhat chastened status was that of a conceptual apparatus 
largely developed in the adjacent world of literary study and, by virtue 
of that proximity, able to cast an interesting sidelight on aspects of mu-
sicology, but necessarily inadequate for the task of describing music’s 
distinctively musical features.3
Yet on refl ection I think there must be more than this to the relation 
between music and narrative. It may be true that listeners who proj-
ect a story onto music, even in the absence of accompanying paratex-
tual cues, do so without warrant from the music itself; but that does not 
mean that they do it quite arbitrarily and without cause. By the same 
token the narratological interests of music scholars are, at the very least, 
symptomatic of something. The qualities of narrative and music may 
be divergent in many important respects—irreducibly so—but they do 
seem to share a common core that is both cognitively fundamental and 
primitive. This essay briefl y reviews the current state of narrative re-
search in musicology in order to establish a basis for exploring the com-
mon features of music and narrative. It does so by appealing to perspec-
tives from human evolution and infant development and draws upon 
current interdisciplinary discussion of the origins of music, and its re-
lation to language, in order to advance the view that music has an even 
closer relation to narrative than to language. My analysis focuses upon 
rhythm and addresses in turn the somatic, social, and affective founda-
tions shared by narrative and music, and their importance within the 
context of prelinguistic communicative behavior. It then considers ar-
guments about the emergence of language from protocommunicative 
behavior of this kind; these arguments throw light on the development 
of narrative intelligence and on the divergence of narrative and music—
at the level both of individual cognition and of sociocultural pattern 
making. In this way I aim to outline a perspective on narrative cogni-
tion, stories, and storytelling that can help clarify some key assumptions 
of contemporary narrative scholarship.
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Narrative in Musicology
The case in favor of a principled narrative approach to music now 
seems to rest upon two key strategies.4 One strategy is to reject the nor-
mative status of literary narrative, and with it much of the narratologi-
cal terminology that is, if not exclusively relevant for, certainly native 
to literary narrative study. The other strategy is to emphasize a herme-
neutic model of musicology—in other words, one in which the contexts 
and processes of interpretation are considered an intrinsic part of the 
object of study. Both strategies shift the focus of attention away from a 
reductive narrative model of musical discourse in itself, but in opposite 
directions: the fi rst makes the narrative connection at a lower, more ab-
stract structural level; the second locates it at a higher contextual level 
that incorporates both musical event and interpretative response. They 
are also co-dependent strategies, since neither perspective suffi ces with-
out the other.
The structural approach is fi rst of all an appeal to semiotics and 
provides for considerable interpretative fl exibility in the identifi cation 
of units of meaning in music, which may be constructed as agent-like 
(themes, instruments or voices, melodic or rhythmic motifs, and other 
isolable musical features), but need not be, since the units in question 
may be essentially relational or transformational (as with harmonic 
progressions and other goal-oriented formal patterns). The essential 
consideration, from a narrative point of view, is that the structural fea-
tures provide for temporal development, so that the music “takes a cer-
tain set of culturally meaningful differences and transvalues them by 
means of a sequence of action[s]” (Liszka 1989: 117).5 This structural 
conception of musical narrative does away at a stroke with the main ob-
jections musicologists have raised to a narratological perspective, since 
the objections focus on the absence of certain basic elements of literary 
narrative in music: its nonreferential quality (and consequent depen-
dence upon verbal cues for narrative interpretation) and hence its lack 
of distinct story and discourse levels (along with more specifi c features 
contingent on that distinction, such as a causal logic, a narrator, and a 
tensed temporal perspective). The semiotic approach also defi nes nar-
rative broadly enough to neutralize any criticism based on the claim 
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that music is more like drama than literary narrative. But it does so at 
a cost, which is that the notionally narrative meaning it accommodates 
lacks any specifi city and thus offers any number of ways of conferring 
narrative structure on a given musical composition. For this reason it 
cannot suffi ce as a narrative conception of music without the supple-
ment of interpretative response, the function of which is to fl esh out the 
semiotic structure of the music, realizing the potential of its emotional 
contours in a specifi c form. The narrative particulars here, it should be 
noted, do not have to be goblins walking quietly over the universe, as in 
Helen Schlegel’s response to Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony in Howards 
End (Forster 1910/2000: 28); what is necessary is just that they capture 
the temporal unfolding of a formal pattern in the music—regardless of 
whether the meaning attributed to the pattern is articulated in techni-
cal, literal language or fanciful metaphor. In other words the subjective 
response completes the realization of the music by assimilating its tem-
poral unfolding of formal confl ict and hierarchy in terms of a particu-
larized negotiation of values.
There is, of course, a risk that the concept of musical narrative, dis-
tributed in such a way between abstract structure and interpretative re-
sponse, might fall between these two stools. The status of the musical 
event itself seems radically ambiguous: if it is narrative only under in-
terpretation, how does it differ from any other kind of event that we 
might subject to our powers of narrative understanding? Something 
happening—an occurrence or behavior—is always potentially the occa-
sion for an effort of narrative sense-making, but the happening at issue 
does not therefore possess an intrinsic relation to narrative. The argu-
ment requires that a musical event, although it lacks any semantic spec-
ifi city, is nonetheless capable of establishing a sense of narrative inten-
tionality, rather than just being narratable in the same way as any other 
event. Music may arguably manifest a communicative intent to elicit 
narrative interpretation, even in the absence of representation, and it is 
a nice question whether such communicative behavior qualifi es as nar-
rative. My concern here, however, is not to make a case for or against 
the notion of musical narrative, but to consider the signifi cance of the 
affi nities between music and narrative.
In this connection, two aspects of recent interdisciplinary research 
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are worth pursuing. First, by yoking musical form and interpretative 
response this research has favored a social or intersubjective concept 
of musical meaning in which the formal articulation of music carries 
communicative intention even as it admits multiple, possibly contradic-
tory, ways of specifying that intentionality. Second, working within this 
broadly social perspective on musical meaning, theorists have located 
everything from the nonspecifi c affective qualities of musical form to 
the listener’s semantic particularization of such qualities on one contin-
uous semiotic scale. These are the concerns I want to carry forward in 
the sections that follow, as I shift from the topic of the interdisciplinary 
connections between narratology and musicology to the slightly differ-
ent issue of the cognitive connections between narrative and music.
Narrative and Music in Cognition and Communication
In order to see the common core of narrative and music, I suggest, we 
need to get behind the issue of representation. With respect to narra-
tive, this issue is broader than language, both because of the diversity 
of the representational media within which narrative may be articulat-
ed, and because mental representations, and hence narrative cognition, 
cannot be accommodated within a linguistic model. Nonetheless, it is 
helpful to begin with the substantial body of interdisciplinary research, 
in the contexts of developmental psychology and human evolution, that 
engages with the relation between music and language.
The fundamental claim of recent contributions to this research is 
that music, contrary to Steven Pinker’s somewhat dismissive account 
in How the Mind Works (1997), plays an essential role in human cogni-
tive development and evolution.6 More specifi cally, the origins of music 
predate language in the prehistory of the species and arguably usher in 
the emergence of language: a protomusical phase can be seen as a nec-
essary part of language evolution in Homo sapiens and may have been 
as far as Neanderthal communication ever got.7 This evolutionary per-
spective broadly corresponds to a developmental perspective that charts 
the progress in children’s communicative skills from a protomusical 
kind of interaction, typifi ed by the distinctive features of Infant Di-
rected Speech, toward full linguistic competence.8 Such research draws 
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strength from the prominence linguists give to recursion as a defi ning 
feature of human language, since recursion is not itself linguistic in ori-
gin or limited to verbal phenomena (Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch 2002) 
but is also a feature of musical structure, appearing in such elementary 
musical hierarchies as meter (Sloboda 1998).
The argument about the role of music (or protomusic) in phylo-
genetic and ontogenetic development also involves taking sides in the 
debate between atomistic and holistic models of protolanguage; the 
atomistic model emphasizes the foundations of language in a lexicon 
(Bickerton 1996), while the holistic model emphasizes the primacy of 
complete messages or communicative gestalts, rather than words, as 
the earliest forms of expression (Wray 2002). The holistic model is thus 
more hospitable to the view that language and music share a common 
foundation in a protocommunicative form of expression that has been 
termed “musilanguage” (Brown 2000), because this model allows for a 
stage in the development of communication grounded in the preemi-
nently musical capacity to express emotive force rather than the capac-
ity for symbolic reference, which music lacks. The holistic emphasis 
upon emotive force is related to a further premise, invoking the un-
derlying unity of music and dance, which is that in protomusical ex-
pression vocal performance is continuous with movement and gesture. 
Hence voice and movement can both be understood in the fi rst instance 
as physical, muscular processes, and their communicative potential, 
with respect to both protolanguage and infant development, can be 
linked in turn to the role played by mirror neurons in representing ac-
tion (Arbib 2003; Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998).9
We can gain some understanding of the cognitive abilities common 
to music and language by adopting both a phylogenetic and an ontoge-
netic perspective on the mind’s development before the acquisition of 
symbolic thought. This approach, however, does not quite take us back 
to the point of divergence between music and narrative, since the media 
of narrative may involve iconic representation rather than, or as well as, 
symbolic representation. Iconicity of this sort is evident in fi lm, mime 
and dramatic performance, sequential art forms such as comics, and—
in the domain of mental representations—dreams and memories. For 
this reason it is plausible to suppose that the relation between narra-
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tive and music is more fundamental, more primitive, than the relation 
between either one and language or symbolic thought. Iconic represen-
tation, unlike symbolic representation, is a mode of communication 
(or mental articulation) that exists on a continuum with nonrepresen-
tational, or incompletely representational, behavior. It is one end of a 
spectrum of behavior that may be usefully subdivided by distinguishing 
(after Merlin Donald) among mimicry, imitation, and mimesis: mimicry 
aims at the exact duplication of behavior, as a parrot reproduces cries 
or speech; imitation is less direct, appropriating the source behavior in 
some new context, as children copy their parents, and as primates learn 
from each other; and mimesis is representation proper, in that it makes 
the same strategies serve the purpose of encapsulating and re-presenting 
some specifi c or general behavior in an act of social communication or 
private comprehension (Donald 1991: 168–69). This full spectrum of be-
havior is characterized by a degree of direct or indirect repetition, and 
this behavioral doubling is what provides for its narrative potential. In 
general, behavior that constitutes an act in itself shades into behavior for 
communicative purposes, or ostensive behavior, to the extent that such 
communicative intention is manifest (Sperber and Wilson 1986). That 
is, any behavior may be communicative if it allows others to infer that 
it was intended for their attention, rather than merely serving its pur-
poses as action. For such behavior to have a specifi cally narrative dimen-
sion, however, it must invite attention to its qualities as action (rather 
than, say, drawing attention to some object). Donald’s spectrum of pre-
mimetic behaviors charts a gradual foregrounding of such refl exiveness; 
the cusp of narrative representation, then, is not determinate but arises 
somewhere along a scalar range of more or less ostensive behavior.
My claim is that narrative and music make common cause within 
the domain of ostensive behavior, and I think that refl ection upon the 
common features of narrative and music in such terms can enhance 
our understanding of the cognitive and communicative force of narra-
tive in general. There are multiple points of signifi cant correspondence 
within these parameters; it seems to me that a full account would need 
to include discussion of narrative analogies for both melody and har-
mony. But for my purposes here I concentrate upon the most obvious 
and straightforward point of contact: namely, rhythm. Rhythm does 
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not just connect music and narrative; it is clearly important in specifi -
cally linguistic contexts where musicality remains at the fore (poetry, 
Infant Directed Speech), and it is also a signifi cant, if often subcon-
scious, element of oral communication (Auer, Couper-Kuhlen, and 
Müller 1999). It is particularly important as a common feature of mu-
sic and narrative because they both deal, in divergent ways, with sig-
nifi cant temporality. Music and narrative, of course, are intrinsically 
temporal forms—and here I’m referring to narrative’s discursive tem-
porality, not its representation of temporal sequence, though the latter 
can be considered an effect of conceptual recursion in the former, as 
I discuss below. Narrative and music are temporal forms not because 
they persist in time but because they are articulated in time; that is, 
they give structure to the fl ux of experience. In turn, rhythm is our 
most basic experience of temporal structure.
In what follows, in order to elaborate the signifi cance of rhythm as 
an index of the shared foundations of music and narrative, I consider 
rhythm under three headings, taken from Ian Cross’s characterization 
of music’s general attributes: embodiment; entrainment, or the tenden-
cy of listeners to adopt a rhythm, physically or mentally; and transpos-
able intentionality (2003: 24). These terms also point to three key attri-
butes possessed by protonarrative—namely, its somatic foundation, its 
social orientation, and its affective quality.
Embodiment
I suggested that the distinguishing feature of temporal forms is that they 
are articulated in time; but articulation in time is only possible on the 
basis of the persistence, in some sense, of what is past—and that, in its 
most elementary form, is what rhythm provides for. A beat or pulse, to 
function as a beat at all, must be both a punctual event in itself and the 
fulfi llment of an expectation raised by previous beats. This persistence 
is not, in the fi rst instance, a cognitive fact but a somatic one; rhythm is 
something we experience physically, with reference to our own bodies. 
There are several possible ways to locate the somatic sources of rhythm: 
obviously there is the heartbeat and the arterial pulse (our own, but 
also our prenatal experience of the maternal heartbeat); more specifi c 
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to vocal musicality, there is breath, which importantly spans the divide 
between involuntary and voluntary somatic rhythms; and more specifi c 
to dance, there is pace. Walking and running pace is important as the 
most prominent voluntary action bearing upon our rhythmic frame of 
reference and constitutes one of the many signifi cant ramifi cations of 
the move to bipedalism in the course of human evolution.10 The fact 
that the somatic basis of rhythm has multiple frames of reference is it-
self important to the layered, hierarchical quality of our rhythmic sense; 
more specifi cally, the capacity for different rhythms to synchronize to a 
common beat (as with breathing and running pace, for example) is cen-
tral to entrainment, on which I elaborate below.
The uniquely human signifi cance of these somatic rhythms, howev-
er, depends upon their relation to our cognitive faculties (other species 
breathe, run, and circulate their blood, after all). John Bispham (2006) 
argues that specifi cally musical rhythmic behavior is distinguished by 
its reference to a sustained attentional pulse, beyond purely biomechan-
ical effi ciencies (126). An attentional pulse is a temporal, as opposed to 
spatial, focus of attention; it may vary from being weak and temporally 
broad (within the constraints of an attentional cycle) to being intense 
and narrowly focused, as it is in the perception of a regular rhythm. In 
terms of protomusical or protonarrative communication (whether this 
mode of communication is conceived as an evolutionary or a develop-
mental stage), such a model of the relation between cognition and em-
bodied rhythm elucidates the sense in which rhythmic behavior is os-
tensive without referring beyond itself—or to anything other than its 
own abstract temporal structure. Rhythmic behavior in itself involves 
no separation, temporally or conceptually, between act and “meaning,” 
or communicative force, but it is nonetheless possible to say that in the 
most general, formal terms the enactment of rhythm is communicative. 
Rhythm communicates by punctuating or articulating experience, and 
it is the experienced articulation that is communicated.
Colwyn Trevarthen, writing from the disciplinary perspectives of 
psychobiology and music therapy, argues that the attentional pulse of 
musical rhythm can be seen as integral to a system of pulse generators 
he calls the Intrinsic Motive Pulse, which governs thought, emotion, 
and movement. These pulse generators operate on a spectrum of struc-
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tured time intervals ranging from those too short for conscious dis-
crimination to those that exceed the attentional span and depend upon 
memory and imagination (1999). In the case of the longer intervals, 
Trevarthen’s notion of a pulse abstracted from the experiential present 
shifts the principle of rhythmic repetition in the direction of iconic en-
actment; here we can plausibly discern a basis for the conceptual sepa-
ration between the protonarrative act and its referent, and hence for the 
transition from behavioral interaction to representational communica-
tion. The shift from protonarrative ostensive behavior to iconic repre-
sentation (in thought or deed) means that the sense of rhythm becomes 
attached to the representational discourse, since there is no longer a 
necessary, literal temporal equivalence between the representation and 
the event represented.
Thus, the rhythm of a (hypothetical) ritual dance—one, for ex-
ample, that serves to establish the cohesion and affective orientation 
of a hunting party—is in itself both ostension and action. By con-
trast, a representational dance that re-enacts the events of a hunt has a 
rhythmic structure that is distinct from that of the action it represents. 
Here the physical rhythm of the dance is yoked to a kind of concep-
tual rhythm—the rhythm of represented time. In other words, the ex-
periential pulse of the dance is the physical analogue for the conceptual 
structure of the represented events, and this conceptual structure itself 
coheres as an abstract rhythmic succession—one that is not directly ex-
perienced, but rather understood through the iconic representation of 
the dance. But what if we go one step further and consider symbolic 
rather than iconic narrative discourse? In this case, the rhythm of the 
narrative discourse, as well as the rhythm of the events represented by 
that discourse, becomes conceptual and abstracted from physical em-
bodiment. The narrative pulse, in symbolic representation, is therefore 
no longer a direct experiential phenomenon at any level; rather, it is an 
equivalent principle of expectation and resolution, punctuating a sense 
of time and sequence that has become fully abstract. Narrative rhythm 
in this context is completely abstracted from rhythm’s somatic origins 
and works instead in relative terms, through the interplay of two con-
ceptual temporal structures—that of the narration and that of the nar-
rated events.
Walsh: The Common Basis of Narrative and Music 59
Entrainment
The somatic basis of music and narrative is also, crucially, implicated in 
a social context. A fundamental characteristic of music, one that is likely 
to have been central in its prehistory and is certainly dominant in our 
infant experience, is that it is a participatory, collaborative activity. In-
deed it is arguable that the social importance of musical behavior arose 
as a consequence of the increasingly prolonged dependency of infants 
in the course of hominid evolution, itself probably related to bipedal-
ism, with its attendant narrowing of the pelvis and restriction on head 
size at birth. Protomusical and especially rhythmic interaction is an ef-
fi cient and affectively powerful way to sustain the connection between 
mother and infant, stimulating the development and enculturation of 
the latter (Dissanayake 2000).
Protomusical behavior could function socially, in a presymbolic com-
 municative environment, as both a means of establishing and sustain-
ing social cohesion and as a way of inducing more specifi c collaborative 
behavior. Its emotional force is the key to this social role, and again it is 
possible to delineate its essential features in relation to rhythm. In an 
entirely prerepresentational context the effi cacy of social interaction is 
directly behavioral; it is a matter of stimulus and response, as is typically 
the case with signals and cries throughout nature. This is not to deny the 
function of mimicry and imitation in the learning of protomusical be-
havior, which is an evolved feature not only of hominid communication 
but also of birdsong and whale song (Mithen 2005: 283–86); it is sim-
ply to characterize such communication as behaviorally manipulative 
rather than representational. The specifi c mechanism for this effect in 
the case of rhythm is entrainment; again, this term refers to the way we 
respond to the felt regularity of a rhythm by conforming to it, by physi-
cally adopting it ourselves. Entrainment involves two distinct process-
es, called phase correction and period correction. Phase correction, the 
broader concept, is involved in our general ability to synchronize action 
with an anticipated event; it is an essentially automatic control mecha-
nism. By contrast, period correction involves conscious awareness, be-
ing a specifi c adjustment to the tempo of a sustained rhythm (Bispham 
2006: 130). Period correction appears to be a uniquely human ability; 
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no other social animal, primates included, displays a capacity for rhyth-
mic entrainment, and the distinctively human sense of social cohesion 
it generates is likely to be bound up with other species-specifi c cognitive 
attributes.11 Nonetheless, entrainment is solidly grounded in the somatic 
basis of rhythm—indeed the simple act of marching together in time 
has been discussed as a powerful instance of entrainment itself and of 
the effects of social bonding that it can produce (McNeill 1995).
The phenomenon of rhythmic entrainment, then, straddles the 
boundary between involuntary physical response and conscious choice. 
Entrainment to a rhythm may be manifest in physical participation 
(and it is often hard not to participate, if only by tapping a foot, sway-
ing, head nodding, etc.), but its basis lies in brain activity, and so it does 
not necessarily result in external physical expression. Music’s founda-
tions in motor function, of which rhythmic entrainment is an obvious 
example, have occasioned considerable research into the connections 
between musical experience and the mirror neuron system (Molnar-
Szakacs and Overy 2006). Mirror neurons, as a basis for the neural rep-
resentation of action, help to explain the synchronized action of physi-
cal entrainment and also account for the sense of affective identifi cation 
that goes along with it, as an effect of the neural equivalence between 
perceived and performed action. Implicit in this equivalence, however, 
is difference; precisely because the neural representation is equivalent 
to the action, there is always the possibility that perception may not re-
sult in physical participation. It is inherent in the general functioning of 
the mirror neuron system that mental representation may be decoupled 
from reaction, and such a development has far-reaching consequences 
for cognition and social behavior.
Relevant here is the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis, which 
concerns the process of cognitive adaptation to social complexity and 
applies to both primate and human social groups (Byrne and Whiten 
1988). Central to this hypothesis is the proposition that the pressure to-
ward increasing intelligence in human evolution was a product of social 
rather than environmental demands. Despite the connotations of the 
name, the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis does not imply the end 
of social cohesion in the name of manipulative self-interest, but it does 
make social behavior contingent upon the motivated choices of par-
Walsh: The Common Basis of Narrative and Music 61
ticular individuals. The nature of the social environment thus becomes 
a matter of which choices (and so which motives) ultimately prosper. 
The mere existence of rhythmic entrainment, then, with its voluntary 
aspect of period correction, testifi es both that social cohesion proved 
adaptive in the course of human evolution, and that voluntary commu-
nal participation was consolidated by the motivating force of rhythmic 
entrainment’s affective value in protomusical behavior.12 In terms of the 
ritual hunting dance example, rhythmic entrainment serves to motivate 
group behavior (the hunt), and the survival advantage of participating 
in this behavior selectively reinforces the propensity for entrainment. 
But it is equally important, given that mental representation need not 
lead to action, that the affective value of entrainment would also have 
been felt in the domain of purely mental response. Such mental en-
trainment is a specifi c manifestation of the development of theory of 
mind, a key feature of the accelerated growth in cognitive sophistication 
envisaged in the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis.
Theory of mind is an essential part of specifi cally narrative cogni-
tion; it involves the adoption of a recentered perspective in relation to 
the behavior of another member of the social group—a cognitive move 
that is the conceptual equivalent of rhythmic entrainment and might 
be called narrative entrainment. This aspect of narrative understand-
ing, like rhythmic entrainment, is compounded of an involuntary, so-
matic or intuitive component (call this empathy) supplemented by a 
conscious, voluntarily relational component (call this sympathy).13 Em-
pathetic alignment with the behavior of another member of the social 
group makes it possible to attribute intentions and goals to the person 
who performs that behavior and thereby facilitates understanding. In 
addition, sympathetic alignment may consent to the effect of narrative 
entrainment and allow for collaborative behavior. The element of de-
tached choice inherent in sympathy means that narrative understand-
ing is always potentially a tool of manipulation in the true Machiavel-
lian style—there is no guarantee of benign effect, and understanding 
may equally well be a precursor to exploitation—but that element of 
choice also implies that narrative entrainment involves the affi rmation 
of persistent social values, beyond the particular occasion.14 Rhythmic 
entrainment, then, as an effect common to narrative and music, may 
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mark the beginnings of a shared context of values that could be de-
scribed as cultural. It certainly provides support for a view of narrative 
intelligence in keeping with the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis, 
in which the need to make social sense precedes and leads on the ability 
to make sense of our larger environment.15
Transposable Intentionality
If the common origins of music and narrative are crucially involved 
in social behavior, they also imply the importance of a communicative 
context; yet it is clear that the somatic, experiential basis of such inter-
action is not in itself an adequate vehicle for specifi c meaning. This re-
fers us to the aspect of music that Cross calls transposable or “fl oating” 
intentionality (2005: 30); music creates an effect of “aboutness,” without 
any determinate referent (other than what we may attach to it, more or 
less idiosyncratically, in response). The capacity to respond to incho-
ate meanings of this sort would appear to precede representational be-
havior, and we might therefore assume fl oating intentionality to be a 
characteristic of the common, protocommunicative precursor to mu-
sic and narrative. Most fundamentally, the experience of rhythm makes 
tangible a sense of temporal extension itself, primarily as a matter of 
felt recurrence, the felt persistence of a structure or pattern to experi-
ence, rather than as a matter of memory. It also offers, in the basic alter-
nating structure of pulse and interval, as pure a manifestation of affect 
as it is possible to conceive. Affect, as an abstract, nonconscious quality 
of experiential intensity (distinct from specifi c emotions), is embodied 
in rhythm as a formalized alternation of tension and release, effort and 
relaxation, concentration and ease. This basic alternation, itself suscep-
tible to variation in tempo and intensity, to either cumulative or dis-
sipative effect, articulates the psychodynamic foundations of emotion.
In its musical legacy this somatic experience of affect remains close 
to the etymology of “emotion”; music moves us, and our movement, 
whether physically actualized or neurally virtual, is how its affective val-
ue is brought out in us. Narrative, in its somatic foundations, shares in 
this literal sense of emotional value; but more importantly the fl oating 
affect of rhythm also transfers to the conceptual, abstract rhythms that 
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constitute the most elementary cognitive schemata for narrative struc-
ture. The affective value of narrative structure, its formal articulation of 
a psychodynamics, is a familiar idea. Thus, for Frank Kermode, in The 
Sense of an Ending (1966), affect of this sort pervaded instances of the 
narrative imagination from fi ctions of apocalypse on the cosmic scale 
down to the tick-tock we attribute to the clock.16 Kermode regarded our 
imposition of narrative form as symptomatic of a need for meaning, 
a compulsion to humanize time; but a perspective from the common 
origin of music and narrative, grounded in somatic experience, would 
imply something like the reverse. In this view the human sense of time 
would be, from the fi rst, saturated with affect—with the rhythm of be-
ginnings and endings—and the possibility of conceiving of an imper-
sonal, objective time, an abstract temporality independent of the sig-
nifi cant structure of (proto) narrative, would be a much later and more 
diffi cult intellectual achievement. The more general point, however, is 
that there seems to be a misplaced emphasis in the attempts of musi-
cologists to analyze the meaning of music by adopting the tools of nar-
rative theory: it isn’t that music has meaning; rather, it’s that narrative 
has affect. In other words, much of the power of narratives, even very 
simple ones, to move and persuade is not specifi c to whatever those 
narratives are about; it is the affective potential intrinsic in the permu-
tations of narrative form itself.17 To take a literary example, the affective 
power of The Iliad saturates its representation of the actions of heroes 
and its thematic juxtaposition of heroic agency with fate, manifested in 
the repeated interventions of the gods; but this affective power does not 
derive from these meanings in themselves so much as from the cumula-
tive, many-layered narrative rhythm of their articulation, which extends 
from the many smaller cycles of action and repose, battle and politics, 
heroic feats and divine reversals, up to the grand period of the inaction, 
rage, and fi nal relenting of Achilles.
The notion of an affective intentionality common to music and nar-
rative also refers us back to the holistic model of protocommunica-
tive behavior and to arguments for a holistic protolanguage that shares 
the rudimentary qualities of music. These arguments depend (in part) 
upon being able to fi nd a route from such a mode of communication 
to the compositional and recursive structure of language as we know 
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it. The challenge here is specifi c to communication; there is no obvious 
bar to a structural development from holistic to compositional musical 
behavior, even within purely rhythmic terms—and the fact that musi-
cal rhythm has an inherently recursive, layered structure might facili-
tate such elaborations, providing for the permutation of both metrical 
subdivisions (within the same bar) and hypermetrical combinations 
(across several bars) of the primary pulse group. In the same way, narra-
tive’s capacity for recursive structure makes possible a trajectory for the 
development of narrative sense-making as the analytical articulation 
of holistic form, by means of the progressive segmentation of the con-
ceptual whole of an action. Narrative compositionality arises, in other 
words, by means of a conceptual level shift relative to an event initially 
grasped in holistic terms; segmentation into sub-events is downward re-
cursion, while the sequencing of events is upward recursion. When nar-
rative intelligence becomes conceptual and goes off-line, the occasion 
for iconic mental representation, if not symbolic representation, nec-
essarily arises—for example, in the process of projecting the course of 
another’s behavior, or in thinking through a sequence of actions toward 
a goal. Narrative planning of the latter sort begins with that most basic 
rhythmic principle, the oscillation between tension and resolution, de-
sire and satisfaction, the conception of a goal and its achievement. Its 
elaboration is the analytic segmentation of that whole into stages, each 
of which is the desire and attainment of an intermediate goal, and each 
of which may itself be further segmented. The undifferentiated whole, 
in this way, can be sequenced until its stages are brought within the 
bounds of generalizable experience. However, the development of nar-
rative in this direction would be led by efforts of cognition rather than 
communication and need only inform the individual’s social interac-
tion in behavioral terms. In line with the Machiavellian Intelligence Hy-
pothesis, then, the movement toward narrative sophistication is from 
collective behavior to individual conceptualization.
This shift from the social to the private raises an apparent obstacle 
to the progress of communication; its effi cacy for the individual clear-
ly does not provide any basis for shared understanding and hence does 
not make this understanding available as a communicative resource. 
This problem is a particular case of the problem faced by holistic mod-
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els of protolanguage generally—that is, what is the mechanism by 
which the transition is achieved from holistic communication to com-
positional language? An elegant answer has been provided by Simon 
Kirby and James Hurford, in the form of computer simulations of the 
emergence of compositional language. Kirby and Hurford’s research 
demonstrates that the “learning bottleneck” of the transmission of pro-
tolanguage from one generation to the next produces generalization 
from chance unencoded regularities, over the course of many cycles, re-
sulting in the emergence of a stable (though still changing) language 
with compositional syntax (Kirby and Hurford 2002). Their simula-
tions of this “Iterated Learning Model” showed that a protolanguage 
comprising utterance meanings without internal structure could evolve 
into a syntactically regular and recursive compositional language in a 
few hundred generations (130–32). This is a model of the emergence of 
language from a holistic precursor, and it provides support for a view of 
protomusical behavior as part of that development. In such a model it 
is a plausible conjecture that an intermediate stage would have seen the 
beginnings of narrative communication in a shift from ostensive behav-
ior to iconic enactment. This moment marks the divergence of proton-
arrative and protomusic as social discourses, though it is important to 
recognize that this divergence is not a one-sided process. If, on the one 
hand, this split makes possible narrative communication and language, 
on the other hand it makes possible the full development of music as a 
mode of affective interaction released from the exigencies of a practical 
communicative function.
Music’s full expressive resources make for a far more nuanced affec-
tive range than my discussion of rhythm has recognized: melody (un-
derstood very generally as the patterned sequencing of tones) infl ects 
and vastly complicates the rather binary logic of rhythm; harmony 
(again understood at a high level of generality as the resonance between 
discrete tones of related frequencies) exploits the interplay between the 
experience of temporal sequence and simultaneity. The divergent devel-
opment of narrative and music emphasizes the most fundamental dif-
ference between them, which is that they constitute different ways of 
experiencing time—or timing experience. The shift from ostensive to 
representational action (or thought) marks a new relation to time, a 
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dual temporality that is characteristic of narrative intelligence. H. Por-
ter Abbott, in his exploration of the evolutionary origins of narrative, 
associates this dual temporality with the beginnings of verbal narrative 
and the separation between story and discourse order made possible by 
symbolic representation (Abbott 2000: 252). But, in fact, narrative does 
not require language or symbolic representation, but only iconic repre-
sentation, since dual temporality arises as soon as the sequence of the 
narrative representation is conceptually distinct from that of the rep-
resented action. Such dual temporality is a more fundamental matter 
than the manipulation of chronology, for the simple reason that chro-
nology is not the foil to narrative artifi ce but is itself narrative artifi ce.18 
The raw material for narrative artifi ce is not chronology but an essen-
tially spatiotemporal, systemic experience of somatic immersion in an 
environment with multiple simultaneous sensory stimuli; such is the 
systemic temporality formalized by music. The transition from such a 
systemic, in-line experiential environment to the dual temporality of 
narrative cognition is more profound than the capacity for narrative 
discourse to depart from chronological representation (which in the 
end is just the interplay of two degrees of narrative temporality—that 
of the nonchronological discourse and that of the chronological story 
conceived, a priori or a posteriori, as its referential ground). Narrative 
cognition opens a gap between linear and systemic temporality, the fi rst 
being a conceptual remove from the immersive nature of the second. 
Narrative abstracts from experiential immersion; it does not counte-
nance simultaneity (events may be designated as simultaneous in a nar-
rative, but their narrative representation—their articulation as events—
is always sequential). What narrative and music share, then, is a relation 
to the articulation of temporal affect; while music elaborates upon this 
in a systemic, experiential mode at the cost of intentional specifi city, 
narrative elaborates and objectifi es its sequential structure at the cost of 
the immediacy of systemic immersion.
The interdisciplinary encounter between musicology and narratology 
in recent years has tended to focus upon the respects in which narrative 
is, or is not, a useful concept for the understanding of music. By con-
trast, my approach here has been to consider how exploring the possi-
Walsh: The Common Basis of Narrative and Music 67
bility of a music-narrative connection might have implications for our 
understanding of narrative. The fact that this connection has attract-
ed scholarly attention at all suggests that there is signifi cant common 
ground between music and narrative. At the same time, the incommen-
surability of these two modes of expression suggests that the connec-
tion must be sought in a logically or temporally prior form—whether 
via a study of deep structure, cognitive development, or evolutionary 
adaptation. On that basis I have considered music and narrative as nei-
ther directly analogous nor unrelated, but as forms rooted in a com-
mon set of attributes, which substantially constrain and determine the 
nature of narrative understanding and communication. The account is 
intrinsically speculative in many respects and draws upon hints from an 
eclectic range of research; but the point is not so much to tell the story 
of narrative (a project that is in any case vulnerable to crippling self-
consciousness) as to throw our concept of narrative into relief against 
an unfamiliar background.
Notes
1.  Notable contributors to this narratological trend include Anthony Newcomb 
(1983–84, 1987), Peter Kivy (1984), Susan McClary (1986, 1993), Fred Maus (1988, 
1991), Robert Hatten (1991), and Eero Tarasti (1994).
2.  See, for example, Jean-Jacques Nattiez (1990), Lawrence Kramer (1991), and 
Peter Kivy (1993).
3.  This is essentially just a more skeptical description of the state of play de-
scribed by Fred Maus at the end of “Classical Instrumental Music and Narra-
tive,” where he advocates a modest program for research in which “we try out 
analogies between music and narrative, rather than affi rming literal theoretical 
identities” (2005: 480).
4.  The following exposition, excluding the commentary that accompanies it, 
is indebted to Byron Almén (2008), whose summary description of musical 
narrative is worth quoting since it resonates at several points with the issues 
developed later in this essay. For Almén, musical narrative is “a psychologically 
and socially meaningful articulation of hierarchical relationships and our re-
sponses to them. It involves the coordination of multiple structures of meaning 
at multiple levels. It crucially depends upon a confl uence of factors—abstract 
conventions of meaning, specifi c musico-temporal successions, and individual 
interpretation both conscious and unconscious. It is capable of supporting 
multiple interpretive strategies involving different political and temperamental 
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imperatives. It is centrally concerned with the notion of confl ict and its resolu-
tion. It is not essentially dependent upon actorial categories for its realization. 
And it is not a parasitical category of meaning derived from literature, but 
instead features a medium-specifi c infl ection of a more general ‘narrative’ 
principle” (27).
5.  Almén takes this semiotic defi nition of narrative and applies it to music by 
invoking James Jakób Liszka’s transvaluative reformulation of Northrop Frye’s 
four archetypal mythoi, permuted as follows: the victory of order (romance); 
the defeat of transgression (tragedy); the defeat of order (irony); and the vic-
tory of transgression (comedy) (2008: 64–66).
6.  An early version of this view is expounded by John Blacking (1973); a direct 
response to Pinker is provided by Ian Cross (1999).
7.  The general argument is made by Robin Dunbar (2004); its elaboration and the 
specifi c claim about the Neanderthals can be found in Steven Mithen (2005).
8.  Arguments of this kind are presented from a musicological perspective by Ellen 
Dissanayake (2000) and from a developmental perspective by Anne Fernald 
(1992).
9.  Mirror neurons are so called because they fi re both when the agent performs 
an action and when the agent perceives an action being performed by an-
other. Their relevance to music and narrative is further discussed below, under 
“Entrainment.”
10.  Mithen devotes a whole chapter to bipedalism (2005: ch. 10).
11.  Bispham collates speculative possibilities from a range of current research: sus-
tained attention to actual or imaginary events and actions; the role of working 
memory in the rehearsal of events; joint intentionality and the communicative 
manipulation of others’ cognitive environments; and the capacity for complex 
emotions (131).
12.  One plausible explanation for the effect of group cohesion generated by rhyth-
mic entrainment is the prominence of rhythm in mother-infant interaction, 
implying that the affective power of entrainment is an evocation of primary 
intersubjectivity (Cross 2003: 26).
13.  A helpful discussion of narrative empathy in literary, cognitive, and neurosci-
entifi c terms has been provided by Suzanne Keen (2006).
14.  In terms of game theory, narrative entrainment is therefore a factor helping to 
emphasize the long-term benefi t of cooperation rather than defection, by 
serving (in Robert Axelrod’s words) to “enlarge the shadow of the future” 
(Mithen 2005: 213).
15.  Kerstin Dautenhahn (2002) has advanced a view of the origin of narrative in 
preverbal social transactions, in line with the Machiavellian Intelligence 
Hypothesis. This explanation would account for what some scholars of story 
have characterized as the anthropomorphic nature of all narrative representa-
tions, including those that concern the inanimate physical world.
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16.  “Tick is a humble genesis; tock a feeble apocalypse” (Kermode 1966: 45). Ker-
mode’s suggestive insights into the basic motivation of narrative form have 
been elaborated by subsequent analysts, most notably by Peter Brooks in Read-
ing for the Plot (1984), where it is articulated in terms of a psychoanalytical 
model of narrative desire founded upon Freud’s speculations (in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle [1920/1984]) about a death drive.
17.  This view, it should be noted, is essentially in keeping with the conceptual 
spirit, if not the rhetorical articulation, of the perspective on music and narra-
tive presented by Almén, as discussed at the start of this essay.
18.  For a scrupulous analysis of the ways in which chronological narration is far 
from a neutral, zero-degree of narrative, see Meir Sternberg (1992). For an ac-
count that, drawing on Sternberg’s and others’ work, disputes conventional 
narratological understanding of story or fabula, see Richard Walsh (2007: 
ch. 3).
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